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Abstract:  
This article examines the performance of the junior tranche of a Collateralized Fund 
Obligation (CFO), i.e. the residual claim (equity) on a securitized portfolio of hedge 
funds. We use a polynomial goal programming model to create optimal portfolios of 
hedge funds, conditional to investor preferences and diversification constraints 
(maximum allocation per strategy). For each portfolio we build CFO structures that have 
different levels of leverage, and analyze both the stand alone performance as well as 
potential diversification benefits (low systematic risk exposures) of investing in the Equity 
Tranche of these structures. We find that the unconstrained mean-variance portfolio 
yields a high performance, but greater exposure to systematic risk. We observe the 
exact opposite picture in the case of unconstrained optimization where a skewness bias 
is added, thus proving the existence of a trade-off between stand alone performance 
and low exposure to systematic risk factors. We provide evidence that leveraged 
exposure to these hedge fund portfolios through the structuring of CFOs creates value 
for the Equity Tranche investor. 
 
Keywords: Collateralized Fund Obligation (CFO), hedge funds, structured finance, 
portfolio optimization, performance analysis, multivariate linear regression, systematic 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2002, structured finance and hedge funds merged together for the first time. This 
union gave birth to Collateralized Fund Obligations (CFO) which consists in the 
securitization of hedge fund portfolios.This new category of asset seems to offer the 
best of both worlds. On the one hand it provides investors with a new vehicle through 
which to obtain exposure to hedge fund returns, and on the other hand offers to the 
financial engineers a new and quite unique pool of assets that they could securitize. The 
variety of strategies and low correlations with traditional assets make hedge funds an 
ideal candidate as collateral for securitization transactions. Although the theoretical 
justification of CFOs has been firmly established in financial literature (See Cheng 
(2002), Mahadevan and Schwartz (2002), Stone and Zissu (2004) and Missinhoun and 
Chacowry (2005)), there are still many misgivings as to their practical pertinence. 
 
Thus, despite the rapid growth of the CDO market over the past two decades, there 
were no more than 20 CFO transactions prior to 2008. A lack of interest by investors in 
the Equity Tranche of these structures seems to be the source of the slow proliferation. 
The perception of low added-value and high inherent leverage, made it difficult to 
solicitate interest in the junior tranche of CFOs. That said, given the novelty and the 
complexity of these products, which belong to a vast family of derivatives, it is logical to 
suppose that the distinctive fundamental characteristics and benefits of the exposure to 
a CFO Equity Tranche have yet to be carefully scrutinized. This article provides a 
thorough analysis of the factors that might influence the performance of various 
hypothetical CFO Equity Tranches. Using data on historical hedge fund returns, the goal 
is to structure various CFOs based on a variety of underlying portfolios and investigate 
the returns of the Equity Tranche both in terms of stand alone performance and in terms 
of potential diversification benefits. 
 
More specifically, the first objective, from the viewpoint of a CFO equity owner, is to 
define the optimal capital structure(s) as well as the general attributes for the 
diversification of the optimal portfolio of hedge funds for the securitization transaction. 
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The analysis is therefore far more thorough than that observed in existing literature on 
the subject of CFOs. In order to investigate the impact of strategy selection and 
diversification in the underlying hedge fund portfolio, we implement an optimization 
model that allows us to specify preferences for higher moments. This polynomial goal 
programming approach generates optimal allocations conditional to specific investor 
preferences. For each “optimal” portfolio, several debt structures are then considered so 
as to account for a far broader range of scenarios. This is done in order to identify, on 
the basis of a number of performance indicators, the optimal composition of the 
collateral and the appropriate leverage to which the exposure should be subjected.  
 
The second objective is to study the exposure of the CFO Equity Tranche to systematic 
risk factors, such as market, credit and liquidity. In this sense, the study will determine 
the degree to which returns are defined by the returns of readily available risk premia, 
and therefore provide a better idea of their risk exposures. This is achieved using a 
multivariate linear regression model.  
 
The results indicate that CFOs create value from the equity holder’s perspective. 
Nonetheless, there is a trade-off that must be made between the stand alone 
performance of a CFO Equity Tranche and its’ systematic risk exposure. We find that the 
unconstrained mean-variance portfolio yields a high performance but exhibits greater 
exposure to systematic risk factors. We observe the exact opposite in the case of 
unconstrained optimization where a preference for skewness is incorporated, thus 
proving the existence of a trade-off between performance and low-correlation with the 
financial markets. According to our results, an interesting compromise could be obtained 
by securitizing a well-diversified (constrained) underlying portfolio of funds.  
 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the three stage methodology. 
Section 3 describes and analyzes the data and Section 4 focuses on the empirical 
results. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology is comprised of three steps. The first step concerns the allocation of 
hedge funds across the different strategies, the second relates to the structuring and 
evaluation of the CFO, and the final stage consists in the analysis of the systematic risk 
exposures of the resulting Equity Tranche of the CFO. 
 
2.1 Allocation across hedge fund strategies 
To decide on the asset allocation between the different investment strategies we use a 
polynomial goal programming (PGP) optimization model. This approach was introduced 
by Tayi and Leonard (1988), and has been employed by Chunhachinda, Dandapani, 
Hamid, and Prakash (1997) and Sun and Yan (2003) to incorporate the effect of 
skewness on portfolio allocation decisions. Davies, Kat, and Lu (2009) use this 
approach to incorporate investor preferences for higher moments into the construction of 
funds of funds. They extend the original model in order to account not only for skewness 
but also for the kurtosis that is prevalent in hedge fund return distributions. This 
approach incorporates multiple, and often conflicting, objectives and considers the 
impact of a change in investor preferences on asset allocation. 
 
2.1.1 The PGP model 
Consider an environment with m risky assets, each with random return 
~
iR , and xi being 
the percentage of wealth invested in the i th asset. The risk free rate r is constant and no 
short selling of the risky assets is permitted. The percentage invested in the risk-free 
asset is determined by xm+1 = 1 – ITX, where I is an identity vector of dimension m × 1 
and X is the vector of dimension m × 1 of percentages of wealth invested in the risky 
assets. V is the variance-covariance matrix for 
~
R = (
~
1R , 
~
2R , …,
~
mR ). This matrix is 
positive and of dimension m x m. Thus, the problem of portfolio selection can be defined 
using the PGP model: 
MIN  Z = (1 + d1)α + (1 + d3)β + (1 + d4)γ   (1) 
Subject to E [XT
~
R ] + xm+1r + d1 = *1Z ,    (2) 
Performance Analysis of a CFO Equity Tranche 
 
 
5 
  E [XT (
~
R  – E [
~
R ])] 3 + d3 = *3Z ,    (3) 
  – E [XT (
~
R  – E [
~
R ])] 4 + d4 = - *4Z ,   (4) 
  d1, d3, d4 ≥ 0,      (5) 
  XTVX = 1,  xi ≥ 0,  xm+1 = 1 – ITX,  (6) 
where *1Z  = Max {Z1 | X
TVX = 1} is the average return of the optimal mean-variance 
portfolio with a unit variance, *3Z  = Max {Z3 | X
TVX = 1} is the skewness of the optimal 
skewness-variance portfolio with a unit variance, and *4Z  = Max {Z4 | X
TVX = 1} is the 
kurtosis of the optimal kurtosis-variance portfolio with a unit variance; and where α, β 
and γ are non-negative parameters specific to the investor's subjective degree of 
preference with respective regard to the average, the skewness and the kurtosis of the 
portfolio's returns. The form of the objective function ensures its monotone growth in d1, 
d3 et d4 for all possible values. 
 
Even though the technique does not require an investor-specific utility function, it can 
still be inferred that the investors’ utility functions are of higher order than quadratic. 
Importantly, the model’s parameters α, β and γ have an explicit economic interpretation; 
they are directly linked to the concept of the marginal rate of substitution, which 
measures the desirability of foregoing an objective for the purpose of achieving another 
(trade-off of objectives). In short, the problem of a multi-objective PGP is solved in two 
stages. Firstly, the optimal values for *1Z , 
*
3Z  and 
*
4Z  are each obtained within a two-
dimensional unit variance framework. Subsequently, these values are substituted in 
conditions (2) through (4) and the minimum value of (1) is found for a given set of 
investor preferences {α, β, γ} within a four-moment framework. 
 
All resulting portfolios are composed of risky assets (hedge fund strategies) and a risk-
free asset so as to ensure the unicity of each optimal portfolio. In order to ensure that 
the portfolio is solely invested in hedge funds, one must simply redistribute the allocation 
in the risk-free rate to the hedge fund strategies such that the total investment in the 
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risky assets equals 1. Thus yi = xi / (x1 + x2 + … + xm) will be the percentage invested in 
the i th asset (hedge fund strategy i) for the optimal portfolio Y. 
 
Five sets of preference parameters {α, β, γ} are used for the optimization procedure.  
These are: E1 = {α = 1, β = 0, γ = 0}, E2 = {α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0}, E3 = {α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.75}, 
E4 = {α = 2, β = 1, γ = 0.75} and E5 = {α = 3, β = 1, γ = 0.25}. The goal is not to build 
portfolios with fully-representative parameters, but to determine the relative importance 
that must be attributed to each of the higher-order moments of the distribution. 
Simultaneously, one of the main objectives is to characterize an optimal underlying 
portfolio from the viewpoint of a CFO equity owner and it is therefore reasonable to 
suppose that the five sets of preferences should easily suffice. Note that the preference 
set E1 represents a traditional mean-variance optimization. We also perform constrained 
optimizations for each set of preferences, with maximum allocation to each strategy 
limited to 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 50%. Finally, given the recent empirical evidence 
supporting equally-weighted portfolio (for example DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal 
(2005)) we also consider the (1/m) portfolio allocation. In all 31 portfolios will be 
analyzed. The notation that will be employed to refer to a given preference set and 
diversification constraint is Ehk, where h refers to the preference set and k to the 
maximum allocation per strategy. 
 
2.2 CFO Structures 
 
In constructing the CFO structures we follow the approach of Mahadevan and Schwartz 
(2002). Overall, 20 structures are analysed, with each CFOj (j = 1, 2,…, n) being 
distinguished by its debt-to-equity ratio. CFO1 represents the zero-debt case, which is 
simply a direct, unleveraged exposure to the hedge fund portfolio1
 
. The amount of debt 
within the structure is then increased in increments of 5% for each of the ensuing CFO 
structures, up to CFO20 in which the Equity Tranche represents only 5% of the structure. 
Table 1 presents the 20 structures. 
                                                 
1 Costs related to the structure’s management and debt obviously do not apply in the case of this instrument. 
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<Table 1> 
Each CFO has a par value of $400M and a maturity of 7 years2
 
. As the proportion of 
debt increases, we notice that the number of tranches of rated debt also increases. To 
this end, a number of assumptions are made so as to comply with a same economic 
logic across all structures. We therefore assume that the first 200 million in debt (50% of 
the structure) are senior rated (AA), which explains why no junior debt tranche appears 
prior to CFO12. This new tranche (BBB) is capped at 20% of the structure ($80M), so 
that when more than $280M in debt accrues, the BB tranche of debt is added. This new 
tranche is capped at 15%. The final tranche (BB–) only appears in the two riskiest 
structures, i.e. which use the most leverage. 
It is important to note that the model does not include a coupon rate for each of the 
tranches. Instead, the procedure uses an “aggregated” cost of financing expressed in 
basis points in relation to a benchmark index that reflects the total, periodic 
remuneration of creditors, i.e. the owners of the CFO's rated debt tranches. Therefore, 
the greater the number of tranches, the greater the structure’s financing costs. Indeed, 
with regard to structures whose debt represents 50% or less, the cost of financing is 150 
basis points over the 1-month LIBOR. For the two structures that use the most leverage, 
the cost is 450 basis points more than the benchmark rate. Thus, this increased cost of 
capital on a per-level basis illustrates the need for increased returns on the underlying 
portfolio as the structure’s leverage increases. Simultaneously, this aspect of a convex 
increase in costs (150 to 200 bps, 200 to 300 bps, 300 to 450 bps) allows us to observe 
the risk associated with the junior debt tranches. 
 
The common costs underlying our CFO structures differ slightly from those of 
Mahadevan and Schwartz (2002). Specifically, the periodic cost of debt is directly 
calculated by adding the variation in basis points for each level to the 1-month LIBOR 
rate. Consequently, it is assumed that the structures are perfectly hedged in terms of 
interest rate risk, which reduces the number of variables handled without however 
undermining the robustness of the analysis. The senior management fees of 0.5% per 
                                                 
2 These are representative of the size and maturity of a typical CFO transaction. 
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annum and the up-front fees of 3% add to the financial burden of the structure’s 
liabilities. To prevent the up-front fees from disproportinately impacting the first month's 
results, the latter are financed by the structure via a gradually-amortized loan at the 7-
year Swap rate in effect at the time the vehicle is issued (5.85%). For the $12M million 
originally due (3% x $400M), the monthly installment amounts to $174,441. 
 
Thus, from the above information and a series of returns on a collateralized portfolio, it is 
possible to derive a periodic return on the Equity Tranche of any structure for any 
underlying portfolio. To calculate the monthly return of the Equity Tranche of CFOj, hk at 
time t using the return on Ehk, the following formulas are used: 
− −
 +  = + − − − −  
   
, , 1 , 1
0,5%(1 ) ( ) ( * )
12 12
t j
j hk t t hk t j t j
LIBOR AFC
Equity NAV r D NAV PMT D  (7) 
−
−
−
= , , , , 1, ,
, , 1
j hk t j hk t
j hk t
j hk t
Equity Equity
r
Equity
    (8) 
 
where: 
 Equityj, hk, t is the value of the equity of the structure j, hk at the end of month t; 
NAVt-1 is the structure’s total value at the beginning of the month t; 
 rhk,t is the return on portfolio Ehk for the month t; 
 Dj is the value of the debt of CFOj; 
 LIBORt is the value of the 1-month LIBOR at the end of month t; 
 AFCj is the aggregated financing cost of CFOj; 
 0.5%/12 corresponds to the senior management fees reported monthly; 
PMT corresponds to the monthly payment of $174,441 concerning the 
amortization of up-front fees. 
 
A monthly frequency is favored herein; all costs are therefore reported on a monthly 
basis and the income generated by the model is represented by a series of returns, 
each with 84 observations (7 years × 12 months). It is also important to mention that 
contrary to Mahadevan and Schwartz (2002), no distribution of market value gains will 
be performed during the 7 years of the vehicles’ existence. Implicitly, the assumption of 
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a 7-year lock-up period is in effect with regard to the equity owners. In short, this model 
is not intended as a perfect representation of the operations observed in practice; the 
objective herein is to record our findings with regard to the performance of the Equity 
Tranche in relation to the structure’s leverage and the composition of the underlying 
portfolio. Therefore, the assumptions put forward do not prevent us from meeting this 
objective. The model presented, which is purposely simple and robust, enables us to 
meet the objectives of our process without encumbering the analysis with the CFO’s 
structural details. 
 
2.2.1 Evaluating the Equity Tranche 
 
Given the 31 hedge fund portfolios and 20 possible CFO structures, we obtain 620 
series of returns (31 × 20 CFO structures) containing 84 observations each. 
 
An initial analysis of the results is performed using a number of performance measures. 
In addition to calculating the usual descriptive statistics and normality tests for return 
distributions3
 
, several performance measures are calculated to evaluate the risk-
adjusted performance of the different CFO structures. We employ two conventional 
measures, specifically, the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. We also calculate three more 
comprehensive measures, namely the Sortino ratio (see Sortino and Price (2004)), the 
modified Sharpe ratio (see Gregoriou and Gueyi (2003) and Lee (2007)) and the Omega 
measure (see Keating and Shadwick (2002) and De Souza and Gokcan (2004)). 
In sum, after having determined the CFO structures and optimal portfolios from the 
equity owner’s viewpoint using the performance measures stated above, the attributes 
of capital structure (D/E ratio) and the impact of the diversification constraints on the 
underlying strategies are analyzed. These results allow us to draw a first round of 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
3 For a complete description of the tests of normality used, refer to Jarque and Bera (1980), Lilliefors (1967) and 
Genest and Rémillard (2004). 
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2.3 Analysis of the Systematic Risk Exposure 
 
In order to verify whether the Equity Tranche of each CFO is exposed to systematic risk 
factors (market, credit and liquidity) we estimate a multivariate linear regression. If the 
resulting regression coefficients are not significant, this would imply that returns on CFO 
Equity Tranches are not determined by systematic risk fators and hence could offer 
significant diversification benefits to traditional portfolios. The same analysis is 
performed on the returns of the underlying hedge fund portfolios so as to compare the 
diversification benefits resulting from a direct exposure to the hedge fund portfolios 
versus that of a CFO. The variables for the regression are presented in Section 4.3. 
 
3. DATA 
 
The hedge fund data was provided by Desjardins Global Asset Management and 
includes HFR and TASS databases. As of January 31, 2008, 7,533 hedge funds were 
included in the database. The sample consists of monthly returns of hedge funds over a 
period of 17 years, from February 1991 to January 2008. The database includes specific 
information about each fund, including the self-reported investment style. 
 
Of the original 7,533 hedge funds, many had to be eliminated from the study. Firstly, 
2,523 funds of hedge funds were withdrawn because they are not strategy-specific 
funds. Similarly, 126 HFRI and HFRX indexes were deleted. Next, we eliminated 73 
funds that did not report their after-fee returns. Also, to ensure the reliability of data used 
and avoid dealing with self-selection bias, 632 funds were withdrawn from the sample as 
they registered either less than 12 consecutive months of performance or the disclosure 
of their results had been interrupted at some point. Finally, 33 “Regulation D” funds were 
discarded since the latter category only appears as of the late ‘90s. 
 
Given that this article focuses on the optimal allocation of capital across the various 
hedge fund strategies, it is necessary to further examine the distribution of funds across 
the strategies. We observe that across the 29 initial strategies, certain strategies have 
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more than 300 funds while others have less than 30. To address this relative imbalance, 
we opt to aggregate similar strategies. After these deletions and aggregations, the 
returns of 4,146 hedge funds make up the sample over a period of 204 months (17 
years x 12 months). Table 2 presents the distribution of hedge funds across strategies 
before and after aggregation. 
 
<Table2> 
 
We observe that the process results in three new aggregated strategies: Emerging 
markets (Asia, E. Europe/CIS, Global and Latin America), Fixed Income (Arbitrage, 
Convertible Bonds, Diversified, High Yield and Mortgage Backed) and Sectorial (Energy, 
Financial, Health Care/Biotechnology, Miscellaneous, Real Estate and Technology). The 
number of strategies therefore decreases from 29 to 16 and the hedge funds are 
subsequently better dispersed across the strategies.  
 
In order to circumvent the issue of relative size of the strategies, avoid working with 
4,146 assets and further counter the issue of survivorship bias, an equally-weighted 
index is constructed for each strategy. In other words, an average return per strategy is 
calculated for each date of the sample. This allows us to perform the portfolio 
optimization with 16 assets and obtain easily-interpretable results in relation to the 
number, attributed weight and type of the different strategies so as to create the greatest 
possible value for the owners of a CFO Equity Tranche. Hence, from a technical point of 
view, this approach ensures the investment in active (or living) funds for each of the 
strategies without exposure to the specific risk of a given fund. This therefore avoids 
periodically rolling funds, allowing us to maintain the necessary weights, i.e. to put 
forward a passive management strategy. 
 
Furthermore, in order to meet the objectives of the proposed empirical approach, the 
sample is split into two periods. The first ten years of the sample are used for the 
optimization of hedge fund portfolios ex ante, and the final seven years provide out-of-
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sample data to which the CFO structures will be applied. Table 3 presents the statistics 
of each strategy index over the first ten years and over the final seven years. 
 
<Table 3> 
 
If we first make a general comparison between the data of the two periods, we note that 
hedge fund returns over period 1 are higher, more volatile and generally demonstrate a 
greater level of skewness and kurtosis. This result can mainly be explained by the fact 
that period 1 witnessed a very bullish market while period 2 was more unpredictable and 
generated less value on the financial markets4
 
. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
data only cover the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis. Nonetheless, despite the 
obvious disparities between the two periods, the strategies demonstrate similar 
behavior. We observe that the tests of Jarque-Bera, Lilliefors, and Genest and Remillard 
reject normality in the respective proportions of 81% (13/16), 56% (9/16) and 63% 
(10/16) for period 1 and 38% (6/16), 38% (6/16) and 56% (9/16) for period 2. This must 
be considered when testing the normality of returns of the constructed portfolios and 
CFOs. 
As for the comparison between the strategies themselves, we first observe that the 
Emerging Markets and Sectorial strategies demonstrate the best average monthly 
returns while the Short Selling strategy is at the bottom of the ladder. In terms of 
volatility, the above three strategies are, quite logically, at the top of the list, alongside 
with the Equity Non-Hedge and Managed Futures strategies while the majority of 
market-neutral strategies demonstrate the least volatile returns. Secondly, Foreign 
Exchange strategy stands out with its positive skewness while the Merger Arbitrage and 
Event Driven strategies are distinguished by higher kurtosis. When the time comes to 
dissect the composition of the optimal portfolios, it will be interesting to analyze the 
weight assigned in light of these preliminary descriptive statistics. 
 
                                                 
4 The Dow Jones Industrial Average Index recorded an increase of approximately 300% (14.9% on an annual basis) 
between February 1991 and January 2001, and less than 20% (2.5% on an annual basis) between February 2001 
and January 2008. 
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Several other financial time series covering the period over which the CFO structures 
are distributed (2001-2008) are required to perform all the necessary calculations. 
These series, all expressed on a monthly basis, are obtained from Bloomberg. Table 4 
summarizes the descriptive statistics for these secondary variables. The 1-month LIBOR 
and T-bill series both have the same average, but the returns on the latter are far more 
volatile. The 10-year on- and off-the-run government securities demonstrate almost 
identical statistical behavior while 20-year on-the-run securities offer better average 
returns and are less volatile. Finally, we note that these three assets exhibit positive 
skewness (with the exception of the Russell 3000). 
 
<Table 4> 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Optimal hedge fund allocations 
 
Table 5 presents, for three of the sets of preferences Eh = {α, β, γ}, the composition of 
the optimized hedge fund portfolios.5
 
 We observe, conditional on the diversification 
constraint imposed, the weight yi assigned to each strategy. 
<Table 5> 
 
In analyzing the various distributions, we notice first of all that in the case of mean-
variance optimization (α = 1, β = 0, γ = 0), with no weight constraint, one-third of capital is 
allocated to Relative Value Arbitrage and Foreign Exchange strategies, respectively. 
This is logical since these two strategies have the highest reward-risk ratios for period 1, 
i.e. the time window allotted for the optimization process. As the diversification constraint 
on the optimized portfolio is increased, the Equity Hedge and Distressed Securities 
strategies represent the majority of the composition, with the two previous strategies 
situated at the highest possible level permissible under the said constraint. It should be 
noted here that the two least constrained portfolios are identical. This means that even if 
                                                 
5
 For the purpose of brevity, only the results for preference sets E1, E2 and E3 are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
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we allow weights in excess of 50% of the portfolio, no portfolio will be positioned above 
this threshold for this set of preferences. 
 
With regard to the set of preferences E2 = {α=1; β=1; γ=0}, there is equal preference 
between returns and skewness; with no importance placed on the level of kurtosis. 
When the weights yi are unconstrained, almost 45% of the capital is allocated to Foreign 
Exchange strategy, i.e. the one with greatest level of positive skewness. However, it 
may be surprising to see that the Equity Market Neutral and Convertible Arbitrage 
strategies, which are both negatively skewned, are ranked second and third 
respectively. This clearly demonstrates the trade-off between skewness and returns for 
this preference set. It is also interesting to note that as the maximum weight constraint 
becomes more significant, thereby forceably reducing the allocation in the Foreign 
Exchange strategy, the allocation to Equity Market Neutral and Convertible Arbitrage 
strategies practically disappear. It is at this point that the Equity Hedge, Distressed 
Securities, Market Timing, Short Selling and Managed Futures strategies start to 
emerge. These strategies all exhibit positive skewness and lower skewness-return 
ratios. 
 
As for E3 = {α = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.75}, the relative significance of the kurtosis is evident for 
the first time. In this case, we note a more harmonious balance of funds across 
strategies from the very outset. Despite this, the Foreign Exchange strategy is still 
predominant (20% in the least-constrained case) along with Distressed Securities (13%) 
and Market Timing (16%). No other strategy obtains more than 10% of the capital. This 
allocatrion certainly takes root in the weak kurtosis observed in relation to the 
significance of the skewness levels of the three main strategies. For this set of 
preferences, the evolution of diversification constraints has very little impact on the 
allocation of capital. In this regard, it will be interesting to compare the performance of 
these portfolios, where there is optimal allocation through all strategies, to that of 
equally-weighted funds that allocate the same proportion of capital to each strategy. 
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4.1.1 Performance Analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics, the tests of normality and the performance 
measures attributable to the returns of the portfolios examined in period 2. These results 
are presented for the same sets of preferences as presented earlier, and for the equally-
weighted portfolio. 
<Table 6> 
 
In analyzing Table 6 with regard to the descriptive statistics for each series of returns, 
we first see that they are in line with those of their main components, i.e. the strategy 
indexes. For example, the funds of the set E2 demonstrate the greatest level of 
skewness and the non-weight-constrained mean-variance portfolio dominates in terms 
of the return-variance ratio. These characteristics become diluted as diversification 
broadens, while the presence of other strategies gradually normalizes the allocations. It 
is also interesting to note that the equally-weighted portfolio demonstrates the best 
average returns and the most variance. In this sense, it is not surprising to see average 
returns decrease with the diversification of the set of preferences E1 while variance also 
shows a sharp decrease. However, this same phenomenon does not apply to the other 
optimized portfolios for which allocation considers both skewness and kurtosis. In short, 
the mean of all average returns is 0.79 and there is mostly negative skewness and 
positive excess kurtosis. 
 
With regard to the normality of returns, we first notice that normality is not rejected in all 
cases according to the Jarque-Bera test. With respect to the other two tests, the returns 
of five portfolios out of 31 (16.1%) reject the assumption of normality under the Lilliefors 
test, while six out of 31 (19.4 %) do the same when the Genest and Remillard procedure 
is used. This is an interesting result. Although most hedge fund strategy indexes reject 
normality on an individual level, it would appear that when these strategies are 
combined together, the distributions of the portfolios are considerably more Gaussian. 
Let us also recall that the strategy indexes exhibit greater normality in period 2, which 
may be another plausible explanation. In sum, without completely casting aside rejection 
of the null hypothesis, the decrease in the proportion of rejections is undisputable. 
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These results may seem small for a hedge fund environment, but they are still significant 
and confirm the relevance of using comprehensive performance measures, or at least 
those measures that account for all information contained in the tails of the distributions. 
It is also interesting to emphasize that normality is only rejected in the case of highly-
diversified portfolios; the normality of returns of the equally-weighted portfolio is rejected 
by the Lilliefors, and Genest and Remillard tests. 
 
With regard to traditional performance measures, it is the unconstrained portfolio of set 
E1 that has the highest Sharpe ratio at 0.80 while the equally-weighted portfolio comes in 
last at 0.61. For the other portfolios, the value of the Sharpe ratio varies between 0.62 
and 0.67. Consequently, it appears that no distinction can be made between the 
portfolios using this performance measure. On the other hand, the unconstrained 
portfolios of sets E2 and E5 stand out in terms of the best Treynor ratio with a value of 
around 0.80 and 0.20, respectively. Their good performance in terms of Treynor ratio is 
largely due to the low beta coefficient, i.e. the covariance of returns with those of the 
market. It should once again be noted that the equally-weighted portfolio has the lowest 
ratio at 0.04. In sum, if we base the analysis on the Sharpe and Treynor ratios, we would 
conclude that incorporating preferences for higher moments does not generate value. 
Equal weighting is systematically an underperforming strategy and diversification 
generally undermines the performance of a hedge fund portfolio. 
 
If we focus on the more comprehensive performance measures, it is possible to better 
evaluate and discern the advantages of accounting for higher moments. It should be 
noted here that for the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure, the monthly minimal 
accepted returns (MAR) used for the calculations are 0.8% and 1.2%. Table 7 
summarizes the performance for all portfolios with regard to the comprehensive 
performance measure. In addition, a classification of each measure is included. 
 
<Table 7> 
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For the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure, the equally-weighted portfolio dominates, 
which is the exact opposite of the observation made using the two simple performance 
measures. Also, we deduce that equal weighting may be better than the highly-
diversified optimizations found using the PGP model. This is similar to the conclusions of 
DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2005). Nevertheless, certain funds originating from the 
optimization procedure are always among the best performers. As for the lowest values, 
the unconstrained portfolios for the set of preferences E2 and E5 are ranked near the 
bottom, which directly contradicts the results of the Treynor ratio presented earlier. The 
mean-variance optimal portfolio (preference set E1) no longer outperforms.  
 
The modified Sharpe ratio offers a similar classification as the conventional Sharpe ratio. 
Unlike the Omega measure, the modified Sharpe ratio simply incorporates estimates of 
the skewness and kurtosis coefficients. It does not incorporate all information regarding 
the actual empirical distribution. Nonetheless, given the non-normality of the returns 
distributions of certain portfolios, this version of the ratio allows us to establish a more 
precise classification of the different portfolios of funds. 
 
In short, there are seven portfolios that stand out from our performance analysis. These 
are: E1; 100%, E2; 100%, E2; 20%, E4; 10%, E5; 50%, E5; 15% and E6; 6.25%. It is clear that the 
underlying interests appear at two extremes of diversification. Indeed, they are either 
very little or highly diversified, which means that no unilateral deduction can be made 
unless it accounts for investor preference. In the following section, we shall determine 
whether these findings still apply from the viewpoint of a CFO equity owner. 
 
4.2 Performance of the CFOs’ Equity Tranche 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the equity of CFO structures 11, 15 and 18. These 
structures are those deemed optimal from the viewpoint of junior tranche owners. That 
said, the following remarks arise from the study of all of the structures. As in the 
previous section, the descriptive statistics, the results of tests of normality and the 
performance measures are included. 
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<Table 8> 
 
In analyzing the descriptive statistics, we observe that regardless of the securitized 
underlying portfolio, the linear increase of leverage within a CFO structure results in a 
relatively linear increase, at least at the outset, of the first four centered moments of the 
distribution of equity returns. This finding seems logical a priori. However, for a given 
aggregate cost of financing, where the maximum debt level has been reached, average 
returns seem to experience a local peak. 
 
With regard to tests of normality, we see that the Jarque-Bera, Lilliefors, and Genest and 
Remillard tests reject normality in the respective proportions of 5% (28/589), 17% 
(102/589) and 21% (125/589). In all three cases, this represents an increase compared 
to the case of unlevered portfolio of hedge funds, which reinforces the interest of using 
more comprehensive performance measures. Generally speaking, it is possible to 
conclude that the securitization of hedge funds reduces the normality of the return 
distribution of the Equity Tranche. When we look more closely at the distribution of "non-
normality" across structures, we see a more frequent rejection of the null hypothesis as 
the structure’s leverage increases. Indeed, we note for example that using the method of 
Genest and Remillard, four out of 31 funds rejected the normality of equity returns in the 
case of CFO 2; the result is ten out of 31 for CFO 14. 
 
As for the performance indicators, we will focus on the more sophisticated measures. 
First of all, the Sortino ratio increases as leverage increases, reaching a maximum for 
CFO 15, for both levels of minimal accepted returns considered. In the case of the 
unconstrained mean-variance portfolio, the measure is close to 1 with a monthly MAR at 
0.8%, and 0.82 with a monthly MAR at 1.2%. Beyond CFO 15, the ratio decreases 
toward the weaker levels of CFO 20. According to this measure however, there seems 
to be an optimal debt level for the equity owner, beyond which it is no longer beneficial 
to add leverage. With regard to the measure’s overall behavior as leverage increases, 
we once again observe the phenomenon of local peaks for CFOs 11 and 18. 
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The Omega measure behaves in a similar manner to the Sortino ratio except for the fact 
that it decreases beyond a certain threshold when we consider a monthly MAR = 0.8%. 
More specifically, when the minimal accepted return is at this level, the maximum occurs 
at CFO 18 for a value of almost 1.96, and CFOs 11 and 15 are also distinguished by 
their local optimality. With monthly MAR = 1.2%, CFO 20 shows the highest values at 
levels above 1.40. However, if we compare this structure to that of CFO 18, we see that 
the highest values are very close and that the lowest values of CFO 20 are substantially 
lower than those of CFO 18. Thus, the benefits of leverage decrease for CFOs 19 and 
20. In summary, the three structures using a maximum level of debt still dominate, thus 
CFOs 11, 15 and 18. Also, it is interesting to note that at this level of minimal accepted 
returns, it is the equally-weighted portfolio that results in maximum “intra-CFO” values 
rather than the portfolios resulting from the unconstrained optimization. 
 
Finally, the modified Sharpe ratio behaves much the same way as the conventional 
Sharpe ratio. It systematically decreases between CFO 2 and CFO 20, and the rate at 
which the decrease occurs for CFOs 12, 16 and 19 is far more pronounced. The 
estimates of the higher moments used in the calculation of the modified Sharpe ratio are 
however subject to significant estimation error as the size of the sample is relatively 
small. Ultimately, we will rely exclusively on the Sortino and Omega measures given that 
they account more accurately for the actual empirical distribution of the returns. 
 
In short, the performance analysis indicates that CFOs 11, 15 and 18, which maximize 
the debt levels for a given aggregate cost CFO structures, are clearly distinguished from 
the others. The optimal debt-to-equity ratios are therefore 1, 7/3 and 17/3. For every 
dollar of equity, there must be at least one dollar of debt. In this sense, this supports the 
existence of an optimal debt level from the equity owner’s viewpoint, the merit of CFOs 
and thus, the added-value of the latter for the investor. These results also show the 
outperformance of the CFO Equity Tranche, regardless of the structure, when compared 
to a direct exposure to the portfolio of hedge funds. Indeed, if we compare the results of 
the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure from one portfolio of hedge funds to another 
versus the CFO, the latter always outperform the former. It is important to emphasize 
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that if we rely solely on simple performance measures, we would not come to these 
conclusions. 
 
With regard to the relationship between the underlying portfolio and the performance of 
the CFO Equity Tranche, the results show more or less the same pattern as in the 
previous section. More specifically, the funds all behave in a similar manner from the 
equity owner’s viewpoint, regardless of the amount of leverage. This means that the 
same seven portfolios are of interest to the CFO Equity Tranche owner and that once 
again, on the sole basis of risk-adjusted performance, no general conclusion can be 
drawn as to the diversification requirements for an equity owner. It all depends on the 
objectives pursued. As a result, there appears to be independence between decisions 
concerning the underlying portfolio and the debt structure. This is indeed very interesting 
as CFOs are flexible instruments, meaning that it is possible to choose the types of 
underlying portfolio according to one’s need for diversification and the extent of leverage 
based on one’s appetite for risk. 
 
In short, from an initial universe of 589 potential CFOs, the number is now a mere 21. 
Indeed only seven portfolios and three structures are of interest. By including the 
unlevered hedge fund portfolios as CFO 1, we test the systematic risk exposure of 28 of 
the 620 initial instruments using a multivariate linear regression model. 
 
4.3 Systematic Risk Exposure of the Equity Tranche 
 
The following multivariate linear regression model for the verification of the benefits of 
diversification was estimated using the returns of the 28 CFO structures identified in the 
previous section. 
 
CFOj,hk,t = δj,hk,t + β1j,hk STOCKt + β2j,hk DEFt + β3j,hk LIQt + β4j,hk TERMt + β5j,hk TRENDt + εj,hk  (9) 
 
where: 
 
δj,hk,t is the constant term for the CFOj, subjected to the set of preference Eh and the 
diversification constraint k, at time t; 
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CFOj,hk,t is the monthly return of CFOj, constructed using the hedge fund portfolio 
subjected to the set of preference Eh and the diversification constraint k, at time t. 
 
STOCKt is the monthly return of the Russel 3000 stock index at time t. It is used as an 
indicator of financial market performance and is included so as to determine whether 
systematic exposure to equity returns has an explicative power with regard to the 
performance of a securitized hedge fund portfolio. 
 
DEFt is the spread in basis points of the LUCI Total OAS6 index at time t and is used as 
an indicator of the systematic default risk of credit markets. It is included in the model so 
as to ascertain whether systematic default risk in the credit markets influences CFO 
returns. To this end, several variables are used in the literature to capture this notion of 
default. However, as stipulated in Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), among others, 
since the advent of the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market, it has become common 
practice to use the spreads on these instruments to identify the default risk embedded in 
credit risk7
 
.  
LIQt is the spread in basis points between 10-year on-the-run and off-the-run 
government securities at time t. The variable is used as an indicator of the systematic 
liquidity risk of bond markets. This indicator is further explained in Longstaff, Mithal and 
Neis (2005). 
 
TERMt is the spread in basis points between long-term (20-year) and short-term (1-
month t-bills) government securities at time t. It is used as an indicator of systematic 
interest rate risk. This indicator is the same as that used in Fama and French (1993). 
 
                                                 
6 LUCI is the acronym for Liquid US Corporate Indices, a series of bond indexes developed by Crédit Suisse. The 
Total OAS (Option Adjusted Spread) version captures the entire market, eliminating the specific nature of securities 
such as embedded options. 
 
7 The original intention was to use the CDX.NA.IG index spread. However, a thorough study of the series shows that 
there is a lack of liquidity prior to 2004, which could bias the results.  
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TRENDt is the typical time trend that is used when the variables are distributed over 
time. The idea is to eliminate any time trend effect that may result in autocorrelation in 
the data series. 
 
Table 9 presents the value of the estimated coefficients and their respective p-value. We 
recall that the ideal scenario is that of completely uncorrelated returns, i.e. statistically 
null coefficients. In the case of the constant δj,hk,t its statistical significance implies the 
presence of a fixed effect not captured by the model’s variables. 
 
<Table 9> 
 
We first note that the constant δj,hk,t and the coefficient β5, which is attributed to the 
TREND variable, are always significant. This means, on the one hand, that returns are 
specific to each of the instruments. In addition, we see that the values taken by δj,hk,t are 
always positive and increase as leverage increases, thus reflecting greater added-value. 
On the other hand, the significance of β5 confirms that there is indeed a trend in terms of 
CFO returns. It is also interesting to note that this coefficient is always negative, implying 
that returns decrease over the period studied (2001-2008). 
 
When we consider the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest, β1 to β4, it is 
important to emphasize at the very outset that the statistical significance of the 
coefficients follows a rather consistent pattern across the different CFO structures 
tested. Indeed, the same pattern in terms of the statistical significance of the regression 
coefficients is exhibited in the case of direct exposure to the portfolio of hedge fund and 
CFO 11, whereas CFOs 15 and 18 present fewer significant coefficients. It can therefore 
be inferred that leverage has very little effect on systematic diversification. The benefits 
of diversification are therefore not an argument in favor of CFOs. 
 
Regardless of the choice of underlying portfolio and of the selected capital structure, the 
coefficient estimates indicate that the liquidity (LIQ) and slope of the term structure 
(TERM) variables do not significantly impact CFO returns. With respect to the STOCK 
variable, which relates to systematic equity market risk, we note that the estimated 
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coefficient is almost always significant. The estimated coefficient for the default risk 
variable is less stable across the different CFO structures. In the case of exposure to 
CFO 1 and CFO 11, we see that the DEF variable has a significant, negative impact in 
the case of underlying portfolios E1;100%, E2;20% and E5;15%. For CFOs 15 and 18, there is 
a gradual loss of significance of the estimated coefficient for the last two underlying 
portfolios (E2;20% et E5;15%). 
 
Thus, it is the unconstrained mean-variance portfolio that fairs the most poorly in terms 
of systematic risk exposures, while the unconstrained version of preference set E2 
demonstrates the least dependence to the selected systematic risk factors. We recall 
however that this underlying portfolio underperforms in terms of most performance 
measures. It therefore appears necessary to reach a compromise between performance 
and decorrelation with the capital market as the best of both worlds can not be achieved 
simultaneously. Two interesting alternatives appear to be that of E4;10% and the equally-
weighted portfolio that both exhibit a slight positive correlation with equity markets. 
Although not an optimal solution, these results provide strong evidence that it is possible 
to construct CFOs that generate value in terms of both performance and low systematic 
risk exposure. 
 
On the basis of the results above, when the objective pursued by the investor in terms of 
CFO equity is either performance, or decorrelation, an unconstrained portfolio in which 
Foreign Exchange strategy is predominant is essential. Where one wishes to combine 
the two objectives, there must be substantial diversification of the underlying portfolio. 
With regard to the debt-to-equity ratio of the capital structure selected, there is almost no 
impact, notwithstanding exceptions. This therefore implies that CFOs represent added-
value compared to a direct exposure to the portfolio of hedge funds, only in terms of 
performance however, not with regard to diversification in capital markets. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
In response to suggestions that CFO Equity Tranches do not offer value to investors, we 
decided to undertake a thorough examination of the performance of this type of 
investment. The objective was to assess the performance of the Equity Tranche of 
CFOs both in terms of risk-adjusted return as well as systematic risk exposures. For this 
purpose, 30 optimal portfolios (each conditional to a set of preferences and weight 
constraints) and an equally-weighted portfolio were constructed using 16 hedge fund 
strategy indexes. All of these underlying portfolios were then securitized using 19 capital 
structures, which allowed us to analyze the series of returns of 620 CFO Equity 
Tranches.  
 
Interestingly, we observe that if we consider the overall distribution of returns of a CFO 
Equity Tranche in analyzing the performance, securitizing and tranching the underlying 
portfolio of hedge funds adds value for the end investor. Our analysis also finds that 
there was no direct relationship between the optimal portfolio to securitize and the 
capital structure decisions. With regard to the debt-to-equity ratio, we conclude that 
leverage is beneficial for the CFO equity holder when the level of debt is maximized for 
a given funding cost. In addition, our analysis shows that a trade-off takes place 
between performance and systematic diversification; if one considers a combination of 
the two objectives, we conclude that the underlying portfolio must be broadly diversified 
across the various hedge fund strategies. Thus, these conclusions suggest that market 
participants might have been too hasty in dismissing CFOs, and not taking greater 
advantage of the benefits offered by these investment vehicles. 
 
If the reputation of securitization had not already been undermined by its involvement in 
the current financial crisis, the impact of this two-dimensional analysis could have been 
rather different. However, given the present stigma attached to structured products, we 
should not expect to witness new CFO transactions anytime soon. This is unfortunate 
considering that the nature of the problem is one of inaccurate valuation rather than one 
of overexuberant financial engineering, as explained in Longstaff and Myers (2009). 
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Global financial markets are currently seeking to rebuild a sound financial system and it 
will be interesting to see whether CFOs will be favored among the range of investments 
available to institutional investors. For this to transpire, securitization and financing 
practices must be rehabilitated in conjunction with proper governance rules that promote 
greater transparency. 
 
Since it is only a matter of time before financial markets have had the chance to digest 
the consequences of the current crisis, it is relevant to pursue this research further. 
Under this new analysis, it would be consistent to consider alternative ways in which to 
further expand on the conclusions. For example, an actively-managed underlying 
portfolio could be of interest. Indeed, rather than turning to strategy indexes that are not 
readily investible, it would be suitable to use investments in specific funds and make 
readjustments as necessary. From a risk management viewpoint, it would be 
appropriate to examine the potential tools that would allow exposure to a CFO Equity 
Tranche to provide strong risk-adjusted performance with negligible exposure to 
systematic risk factors. Finally, it would be important to assess the impact of high market 
stress (like the one that prevailed in 2007 and 2008) in order to analyze the behavior of 
CFOs in such circumstances. 
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Table 1 
Structural Assumptions for the 20 CFOs Considered 
 
Table 1 presents the 20 capital structures considered. The characteristics of each structure appear on the vertical axis, while the 20 CFO structures are presented horizontally. The 
upper portion of the table shows the features of the five possible tranches and the lower one relates to cost assumptions. Shaded areas designate the absence of a certain tranche 
for a specific structure. 
 
CFO 1 CFO 2 CFO 3 CFO 4 CFO 5 CFO 6 CFO 7 CFO 8 CFO 9 CFO 10 CFO 11 CFO 12 CFO 13 CFO 14 CFO 15 CFO 16 CFO 17 CFO 18 CFO 19 CFO 20
Senior Notes
Rating AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA
Par Value $20 M $40 M $60 M $80 M $100 M $120 M $140 M $160 M $180 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M $200 M
% of Structure 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Advance Rate 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Class II Notes
Rating BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
Par Value $20 M $40 M $60 M $80 M $80 M $80 M $80 M $80 M $80 M
% of Structure 5% 10% 15% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Advance Rate 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
Class III Notes
Rating BB BB BB BB BB
Par Value $20 M $40 M $60 M $60 M $60 M
% of Structure 5% 10% 15% 15% 15%
Advance Rate 82% 82% 82% 82% 82%
Class IV Notes
Rating BB- BB-
Par Value $20 M $40 M
% of Structure 5% 10%
Advance Rate 90% 90%
Total Debt -  $            $20 M $40 M $60 M $80 M $100 M $120 M $140 M $160 M $180 M $200 M $220 M $240 M $260 M $280 M $300 M $320 M $340 M $360 M $380 M
Equity Tranche
Par Value $400 M $380 M $360 M $340 M $320 M $300 M $280 M $260 M $240 M $220 M $200 M $180 M $160 M $140 M $120 M $100 M $80 M $60 M $40 M $20 M
% of Structure 100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
% of MV Gains Distributed on a Current Basis 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total Par Value of CFO $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M $400 M
D/E Ratio -              0.053 0.111 0.176 0.25 0.333 0.429 0.538 0.667 0.818 1.00 1.222 1.50 1.857 2.333 3.00 4.00 5.667 9.00 19.00
Costs and Fees
All in Funding Cost (Spread in bps) - 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 200 200 200 200 300 300 300 450 450
Senior Management Fee N/A 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps 50 bps
Up-Front Fees N/A 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Benchmark N/A 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR 1M LIBOR
7-year Swap rate @ t=0 N/A 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85% 5.85%
Stated Maturity (All Securities) 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years 7 Years
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Table 2 
Distribution of Hedge Fund Strategies within Sample 
 
The table shows the absolute and relative frequencies of each of the hedge fund strategies in our sample. Panel A 
describes the sample before the aggregation of certain strategies while Panel B presents the sample after 
aggregation. 
Strategy Frequency Relative Frequency Strategy Frequency
Relative 
frequency
1 Convertible Arbitrage 100 2.39% 1 Convertible Arbitrage 100 2.41%
2 Distressed Securities 112 2.68% 2 Distressed Securities 112 2.70%
3 Emerging Markets: Asia 88 2.11% 3 Equity Hedge 1359 32.78%
4 Emerging Markets: E. Europe/CIS 71 1.70% 4 Equity Market Neutral 263 6.34%
5 Emerging Markets: Global 109 2.61% 5 Equity Non-Hedge 135 3.26%
6 Emerging Markets: Latin America 26 0.62% 6 Event-Driven 248 5.98%
7 Equity Hedge 1359 32.52% 7 Foreign Exchange 75 1.81%
8 Equity Market Neutral 263 6.29% 8 Macro 293 7.07%
9 Equity Non-Hedge 135 3.23% 9 Managed Futures 299 7.21%
10 Event-Driven 248 5.93% 10 Market Timing 20 0.48%
11 Fixed Income: Arbitrage 75 1.79% 11 Merger Arbitrage 37 0.89%
12 Fixed Income: Convertible Bonds 25 0.60% 12 Relative Value Arbitrage 288 6.95%
13 Fixed Income: Diversified 86 2.06% 13 Short Selling 19 0.46%
14 Fixed Income: High Yield 67 1.60% 14 Emerging Markets 294 7.09%
15 Fixed Income: Mortgage-Backed 56 1.34% 15 Fixed Income 309 7.45%
16 Foreign Exchange 75 1.79% 16 Sectorial 295 7.12%
17 Macro 293 7.01% TOTAL 4146 100%
18 Managed Futures 299 7.15%
19 Market Timing 20 0.48%
20 Merger Arbitrage 37 0.89%
21 Regulation D 33 0.79%
22 Relative Value Arbitrage 288 6.89%
23 Sector: Energy 81 1.94%
24 Sector: Financial 33 0.79%
25 Sector: Health Care/Biotechnology 47 1.12%
26 Sector: Miscellaneous 35 0.84%
27 Sector: Real Estate 41 0.98%
28 Sector: Technology 58 1.39%
29 Short Selling 19 0.45%
TOTAL 4179 100%
Sample BEFORE Strategy Aggregation Sample AFTER Strategy Aggregation
PANEL A PANEL B
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Table 3 
Statistics of Hedge Fund Strategy Indexes 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the Jarque-Bera (JB), Lilliefors, and Genest-Remillard (G & R) normality tests for every hedge fund 
strategy in the sample. Period 1 runs from February 1991 to January 2001, while period 2 covers the seven following years to January 2008. For both panels, the 
nature of the statistics appears on the left-hand-side and the strategies feature horizontally. The descriptive statistics are monthly and include the first four moments 
of the distributions, as well as the minimum and maximum returns. With regard to the tests for normality, the value of the test statistic and a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the value is significant at a confidence level of 95% are presented*. The dummy variable equals 1 when the null hypothesis of normality is 
rejected. 
Convert. 
Arbit.
Dist. 
Securities
Equity 
Hedge
E. Mkt 
Neutral
Equity N-
Hedge
Event-
Driven FX Macro
Mnged 
Fut.
Market 
Timing
Merger 
Arbit.
Relat. Val 
Arbit.
Short 
Selling
Emerg. 
Mkts Fixed Inc. Sectorial
Mean 0.0119 0.0151 0.0180 0.0101 0.0165 0.0165 0.0161 0.0138 0.0146 0.0152 0.0118 0.0145 -0.0039 0.0244 0.0109 0.0200
Standard deviation 0.0116 0.0216 0.0273 0.0111 0.0355 0.0225 0.0206 0.0213 0.0456 0.0257 0.0118 0.0114 0.0828 0.0659 0.0114 0.0410
Skewness -0.1963 0.9182 0.0413 -0.2320 -0.6419 -0.5284 1.5295 0.2341 0.9591 0.7721 -2.5619 -0.7081 0.1929 -0.1586 -0.6013 -0.5642
Kurtosis 5.3599 7.4489 4.1026 2.5946 5.8056 8.8399 7.6032 3.9269 5.9506 4.9391 19.3466 4.501 4.8889 3.2656 6.2689 6.7705
Min -0.0321 -0.0647 -0.0809 -0.0195 -0.1473 -0.0948 -0.0204 -0.0561 -0.0924 -0.0464 -0.0684 -0.0230 -0.3036 -0.1946 -0.0377 -0.1733
Max 0.0510 0.1086 0.1025 0.0338 0.1116 0.1094 0.1178 0.0826 0.2281 0.1154 0.0393 0.0402 0.2783 0.1874 0.0450 0.1399
JB Test (df=2) 28.62 115.82 6.11 1.90 47.60 176.11 152.74 5.39 61.93 30.72 1467.32 21.30 18.58 0.86 60.66 77.45
α=5% ; x ≤ 5.99 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Lilliefors Test 0.007 0.001 0.50 0.02 0.50 0.16 0.001 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.50 0.10 0.01
α=5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
G & R Test 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.09 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.02
α=5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Convert. 
Arbit.
Dist. 
Securities
Equity 
Hedge
E. Mkt 
Neutral
Equity N-
Hedge
Event-
Driven FX Macro
Mnged 
Fut.
Market 
Timing
Merger 
Arbit.
Relat. Val 
Arbit.
Short 
Selling
Emerg. 
Mkts Fixed Inc. Sectorial
Mean 0.0064 0.0114 0.0086 0.0056 0.0103 0.0089 0.0069 0.0094 0.0105 0.0064 0.0052 0.0085 0.0049 0.0167 0.0067 0.0113
Standard deviation 0.0111 0.0134 0.0180 0.0064 0.0345 0.016 0.0099 0.0136 0.0279 0.0243 0.0086 0.0065 0.0470 0.0295 0.0083 0.0214
Skewness -0.4950 -0.1774 -0.6148 -1.2205 -0.4870 -0.7719 1.4167 -0.0101 -0.0549 -0.0420 -0.1752 -0.6253 0.1632 -0.9236 -0.6435 -0.3815
Kurtosis 3.5464 3.2546 2.9455 5.7064 2.7287 3.6133 5.9688 2.7894 2.7363 2.5760 3.9317 3.6192 2.8247 3.3725 3.4356 2.5501
Min -0.0284 -0.0240 -0.0414 -0.0196 -0.0774 -0.0342 -0.0067 -0.0224 -0.0570 -0.0514 -0.0210 -0.0127 -0.1013 -0.0679 -0.0176 -0.0395
Max 0.0339 0.0459 0.0444 0.0164 0.0774 0.0387 0.0444 0.0433 0.0719 0.0596 0.0260 0.0206 0.1281 0.0649 0.0236 0.0570
JB Test (df=2) 4.48 0.67 5.30 46.49 3.58 9.66 58.95 0.16 0.29 0.65 3.47 6.82 0.48 12.43 6.46 2.75
α=5% ; x ≤ 5.99 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Lilliefors Test 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.003 0.006 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.02 0.13 0.39 0.001 0.09 0.15
α=5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
G & R Test 0.03 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.99 0.78 0.04 0.09 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.03
α=5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Period 1: 120 months (February 1991 to January 2001)
Period 2: 84 months (February 2001 to January 2008)
 
*   P-values are available upon request. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Secondary Data  
 
The table presents the first four moments of the distribution as well as the maximum and minimum. The statistics appear on the vertical axis, while the 
time series feature horizontally. They are all presented on a monthly return basis. 1M LIBOR and 1M T-Bill are relative to the money market while the 
Russell 3000 is relative to the stock market. CDX.NA.IG_5Y and LUCI_OAS relate to the corporate credit market while the three whose title starts with 
USA are related to the U.S. government securities, 10- and 20-year maturities. For the 10-year maturity, on-the-run (on-t-r) and off-the-run (off-t-r) rates 
are presented. 
LIBOR 1M  T-Bill 1M Russel 3000 CDX.NA.IG_5Y*ª LUCI_OAS* USA_10Y (on-t-r) USA_10Y (off-t-r) USA_20Y
Mean 0.0026 0.0026 0.0015 4.4948 12.0387 0.0037 0.0037 0.0042
Variance 1.87E-06 5.10E-07 0.0016 1.5875 14.6199 1.50E-07 1.60E-07 1.10E-07
Skewness 0.1906 0.3597 -0.4743 0.9061 0.7873 -0.0265 -0.0301 0.3986
Excess kurtosis -1.6071 -1.2216 0.3473 1.485 -0.5299 -0.4791 -0.5402 -0.5446
Max 0.0048 0.0042 0.0803 9.0417 21.7833 0.0045 0.0045 0.0049
Min 0.0009 0.0016 -0.1064 2.5419 7.5167 0.0028 0.0028 0.0036
* Data are shown in terms of spread in basis points.
ª The statistics relative to this series are calculated from 58 months of available data.
Period 2: 84 months (February 2001 to January 2008)
 
 
 
Table 5 
Composition of Optimal Portfolios for Sets of Preferences E1, E2 and E3 
 
Table 5 shows the composition of optimal portfolios for the first three sets of preferences. All hedge fund strategies appear on the vertical axis and the different portfolios (set of 
preference and diversification constraint) are presented horizontally. The sum of each column equals to 1, as the weights are listed as a proportion of the total value and are all 
comprised between 0 and 1 (no-short constraint). Blanks refer to null allocations. 
 y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%  y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%  y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%
Convertible Arbitrage 0.0267 0.0124 0.0828 0.1364 0.1372 0.0150 0.0799 0.0775 0.0501 0.0501 0.0531 0.0510 0.0569 0.0659
Distressed Securities 0.0941 0.0941 0.0988 0.1154 0.1500 0.1000 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.1326 0.1326 0.1347 0.1315 0.1340 0.1000
Equity Hedge 0.1195 0.1195 0.2023 0.1579 0.1500 0.1000 0.1288 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.0688 0.0688 0.0690 0.0678 0.0700 0.0792
Equity Market Neutral 0.0522 0.1780 0.1774 0.0579 0.0659 0.0488 0.0488 0.0566 0.0503 0.0574 0.0714
Equity Non-Hedge 0.0270 0.0154 0.0154 0.0133 0.0148 0.0197 0.0316
Event-Driven 0.0175 0.0175 0.0537 0.0484 0.0889 0.0003 0.0436 0.0360 0.0360 0.0247 0.0353 0.0367 0.0430
Foreign Exchange 0.2986 0.2986 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.4418 0.4418 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.2055 0.2055 0.2018 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000
Macro 0.0077 0.0454 0.0335 0.0569
Managed Futures 0.0013 0.0106 0.0241 0.1115 0.1000 0.0538 0.0538 0.0606 0.0602 0.0926 0.0870
Market Timing 0.0482 0.0482 0.0582 0.0829 0.1046 0.0926 0.0419 0.0421 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.1616 0.1616 0.1642 0.1633 0.1500 0.1000
Merger Arbitrage 0.0524 0.0524 0.0645 0.0777 0.1074 0.0949 0.0931 0.0935 0.0050 0.0226 0.0238 0.0226 0.0226 0.0253 0.0237 0.0248 0.0312
Relative Value Arbitrage 0.3154 0.3154 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.0147 0.0157 0.0248 0.0271 0.0412 0.0531 0.0480 0.0480 0.0460 0.0488 0.0513 0.0572
Short Selling 0.0344 0.0344 0.0475 0.0486 0.0629 0.0587 0.0307 0.0307 0.0914 0.1103 0.0850 0.0923 0.0739 0.0739 0.0681 0.0735 0.0782 0.0828
Emerging Markets 0.0198 0.0198 0.0211 0.0128 0.0273 0.0271 0.0209 0.0009 0.0153 0.0268 0.0268 0.0159 0.0257 0.0199 0.0209
Fixed Income 0.0204 0.0635 0.0616 0.0011 0.0295 0.0279 0.0279 0.0198 0.0278 0.0337 0.0417
Sectorial 0.0077 0.023 0.0265 0.0505 0.0265 0.0266 0.0283 0.0283 0.0133 0.0263 0.0248 0.0311
HF Strategy E1: {α = 1; β = 0; γ = 0} E2: {α = 1; β = 1; γ = 0} E3: {α = 1; β = 1; γ = 0.75}
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Table 6 
Performance of Optimal Portfolios for Sets of Preferences E1, E2, E3 and E6 
 
The table presents the descriptive statistics, the results of the Jarque-Bera (JB), Lilliefors, and Genest-Remillard (G & R) tests for normality and the performance measures of the 
optimal portfolios for sets 1, 2 and 3 of preference for the moments of distributions; the equally-weighted (EW) portfolio is also presented. Each of the indicators appears on the 
vertical axis and the different portfolios (set of preference and diversification constraint) are presented horizontally. The descriptive statistics are monthly and include the first four 
moments of the distributions, as well as the maximum and minimum returns. With regard to the tests for normality, the value of the test statistic and a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the value is significant at a confidence level of 95% are presented*. The dummy variable equals 1 when the null hypothesisof normality is rejected.The performance 
measures (Sharpe, Treynor, Sortino, Modified Sharpe and Omega (Ω)) are also presented on a monthly basis. Minimal Accepted Return (MAR) levels of 0.8% and 1.2% monthly 
are used for the calculations of the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure. The Modified Sharpe is computed based on a Value-at-Risk calculation with a 95% confidence level. 
E6: EW
 y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%  y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%  y <= 100%  y <= 50%  y <= 25%  y <= 20%  y <= 15%  y <= 10%  y = 6.25%
Mean 0.008077 0.008077 0.008095 0.008058 0.008215 0.008003 0.006376 0.006378 0.007971 0.008180 0.007902 0.008110 0.008031 0.008031 0.007940 0.008021 0.008091 0.008156 0.008597
Variance 4.78E-05 4.78E-05 5.60E-05 6.35E-05 6.94E-05 7.10E-05 3.81E-05 3.82E-05 7.04E-05 7.03E-05 6.86E-05 6.88E-05 6.90E-05 6.90E-05 6.92E-05 6.95E-05 7.18E-05 7.08E-05 9.88E-05
Skewness -0.3793 -0.3793 -0.4507 -0.4436 -0.4165 -0.4582 0.2493 0.2492 -0.0005 -0.1584 -0.1268 -0.2366 -0.1314 -0.1314 -0.0869 -0.1205 -0.1384 -0.2457 -0.4270
Excess kurtosis 0.2581 0.2581 0.3661 0.3442 0.2639 0.2604 -0.1148 -0.1160 0.1839 0.1600 -0.1919 -0.2506 0.0175 0.0175 -0.0213 0.0046 -0.1070 -0.1832 -0.0592
Max 0.0224 0.0224 0.0239 0.0249 0.0268 0.0265 0.0228 0.0228 0.0300 0.0298 0.0277 0.0270 0.0278 0.0278 0.0279 0.0279 0.0280 0.0271 0.0291
Min -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0133 -0.0137 -0.0139 -0.0138 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0149 -0.0136 -0.0110 -0.0115 -0.0126 -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0125 -0.0118 -0.0116 -0.0150
JB Test (df = 2) 2.25 2.25 3.31 3.17 2.67 3.18 0.92 0.92 0.12 0.44 0.35 1.00 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.96 2.57
 α=5% ; x ≤ 5.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lilliefors Test 0.50 0.50 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.12 0.04
α= 5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Genest & Rémillard Test 0.40 0.45 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.60 0.61 0.69 0.20 0.21 0.04 0.33 0.47 0.58 0.33 0.24 0.03 0.00
α= 5% ; p-val ≥ 5% 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Sharpe 0.7972 0.7972 0.7393 0.6898 0.6785 0.6457 0.6174 0.6174 0.6446 0.6702 0.6447 0.6689 0.6583 0.6583 0.6466 0.6549 0.6525 0.6649 0.6070
Treynor 0.0702 0.0702 0.0568 0.0481 0.0474 0.0461 0.7915 0.7981 0.0522 0.0553 0.1018 0.0916 0.0586 0.0586 0.0621 0.0597 0.0684 0.0731 0.0418
Sortino MAR=0 4.1199 4.1199 3.4138 3.0041 2.9266 2.6633 4.8478 4.8465 3.2773 3.2394 3.2702 3.3239 3.2284 3.2284 3.2339 3.2186 3.2002 3.2059 2.3109
Sortino MAR=Rf 2.0198 2.0198 1.7276 1.5519 1.5263 1.3883 1.6841 1.6842 1.6107 1.6178 1.5771 1.6238 1.5932 1.5932 1.5808 1.5872 1.5851 1.5893 1.2827
Sortino MAR=0.004 1.2536 1.2536 1.0929 0.9896 0.9847 0.8910 0.8132 0.8136 1.0037 1.0289 0.9707 1.0153 0.9993 0.9993 0.9812 0.9944 0.9968 1.0040 0.8658
Sortino MAR=0.008 0.0151 0.0151 0.0171 0.0098 0.0350 0.0005 -0.3131 -0.3128 -0.0049 0.0301 -0.0161 0.0182 0.0052 0.0052 -0.0100 0.0035 0.0150 0.0254 0.0829
Sortino MAR=0.012 -0.5255 -0.5255 -0.4957 -0.4775 -0.4495 -0.4623 -0.6963 -0.6961 -0.4793 -0.4573 -0.4834 -0.4620 -0.4733 -0.4733 -0.4814 -0.4733 -0.4610 -0.4539 -0.3614
Sortino MAR=0.016 -0.7610 -0.7610 -0.7360 -0.7178 -0.6970 -0.7016 -0.8462 -0.8461 -0.7101 -0.6996 -0.7142 -0.7033 -0.7090 -0.7090 -0.7129 -0.7084 -0.6995 -0.6971 -0.6174
Modified Sharpe 95%  (α=5%) 1.3294 1.3294 1.0387 0.8847 0.8526 0.7606 1.1171 1.1169 0.9324 0.9382 0.8796 0.8952 0.9174 0.9174 0.9025 0.9110 0.8887 0.8778 0.6542
Ω (MAR=0) 16.3885 16.3885 12.6570 10.8673 10.2516 9.0137 16.8982 16.8859 11.0174 10.5652 10.6381 10.7006 10.5186 10.5186 10.7024 10.4917 10.3898 10.1550 7.4065
Ω (MAR=Rf) 6.9654 6.9654 5.8272 5.2087 4.9906 4.6330 4.9259 4.9265 5.0842 5.1061 4.7611 4.8767 4.9892 4.9892 4.8924 4.9530 4.8828 4.8584 4.1459
Ω (MAR=0.004) 4.2247 4.2247 3.7307 3.4195 3.3414 3.1304 2.6800 2.6812 3.2992 3.3972 3.1035 3.2112 3.2872 3.2872 3.2009 3.2638 3.2174 3.2272 2.9930
Ω (MAR=0.008) 1.0288 1.0288 1.0337 1.0190 1.0682 1.0010 0.5219 0.5224 0.9912 1.0568 0.9711 1.0335 1.0097 1.0097 0.9817 1.0065 1.0276 1.0471 1.1620
Ω (MAR=0.012) 0.2149 0.2149 0.2368 0.2548 0.2856 0.2639 0.1044 0.1046 0.2932 0.3002 0.2666 0.2812 0.2822 0.2822 0.2760 0.2829 0.2954 0.2918 0.3955
Ω (MAR=0.016) 0.0443 0.0443 0.0525 0.0600 0.0683 0.0638 0.0208 0.0208 0.0808 0.0772 0.0705 0.0702 0.0766 0.0766 0.0764 0.0775 0.0802 0.0738 0.1117
E1: {α = 1; β = 0; γ = 0} E2: {α = 1; β = 1; γ = 0} E3: {α = 1; β = 1; γ = 0.75}
 
*  P-values are available upon request. 
 
Performance Analysis of a CFO Equity Tranche 
 
 
33 
Table 7 
Performance and Rank of Portfolios According to the Comprehensive Measures 
 
The table shows the results, on a monthly basis, of the Sortino ratio, the Modified Sharpe ratio and the Omega measure (Ω) for 
all 30 optimal portfolios as well as the equally-weighted fund. The 31 portfolios and their characteristics (sets of preference and 
diversification constraint) appear on the vertical axis and the performance measures are presented horizontally. Minimal 
Accepted Return (MAR) levels of 0.8% and 1.2% monthly are used for the calculations of the Sortino ratio and the Omega 
measure. The Modified Sharpe was computed based on a Value-at-Risk calculation with a 95% confidence level. To the right 
of each measure is the rank of the portfolio for a given indicator; 1 indicates the best performing portfolio and 31, the worst 
performing one. 
E1: {α=1; β=0; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0151 12 -0.5255 26 1.3294 1 1.0288 12 0.2149 26
y ≤ 50% 0.0151 12 -0.5255 26 1.3294 1 1.0288 12 0.2149 26
y ≤ 25% 0.0171 11 -0.4957 25 1.0387 7 1.0337 10 0.2368 25
y ≤ 20% 0.0098 15 -0.4775 21 0.8847 22 1.0190 15 0.2548 24
y ≤ 15% 0.0350 2 -0.4495 4 0.8526 29 1.0682 2 0.2856 12
y ≤ 10% 0.0005 24 -0.4623 12 0.7606 30 1.0010 24 0.2639 23
E2: {α=1; β=1; γ=0} y ≤ 100% -0.3131 31 -0.6963 31 1.1171 5 0.5219 31 0.1044 31
y ≤ 50% -0.3128 30 -0.6961 30 1.1169 6 0.5224 30 0.1046 30
y ≤ 25% -0.0049 25 -0.4793 22 0.9324 10 0.9912 25 0.2932 9
y ≤ 20% 0.0301 5 -0.4573 9 0.9382 9 1.0568 5 0.3002 6
y ≤ 15% -0.0161 27 -0.4834 24 0.8796 24 0.9711 27 0.2666 22
y ≤ 10% 0.0182 10 -0.4620 11 0.8952 17 1.0335 11 0.2812 17
E3: {α=1; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0052 21 -0.4733 19 0.9174 11 1.0097 21 0.2822 15
y ≤ 50% 0.0052 21 -0.4733 19 0.9174 11 1.0097 21 0.2822 15
y ≤ 25% -0.0100 26 -0.4814 23 0.9025 15 0.9817 26 0.2760 21
y ≤ 20% 0.0035 23 -0.4733 18 0.9110 13 1.0065 23 0.2829 14
y ≤ 15% 0.0150 14 -0.4610 10 0.8887 21 1.0276 14 0.2954 8
y ≤ 10% 0.0254 8 -0.4539 7 0.8778 26 1.0471 8 0.2918 10
E4: {α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0067 19 -0.4711 15 0.8944 18 1.0126 19 0.2811 18
y ≤ 50% 0.0067 19 -0.4711 15 0.8944 18 1.0126 19 0.2811 18
y ≤ 25% 0.0070 18 -0.4722 17 0.9029 14 1.0133 18 0.2794 20
y ≤ 20% 0.0082 17 -0.4691 13 0.8907 20 1.0153 17 0.2832 13
y ≤ 15% 0.0278 7 -0.4514 5 0.8797 23 1.0520 7 0.3019 5
y ≤ 10% 0.0337 3 -0.4449 2 0.8531 28 1.0632 3 0.2977 7
E5: {α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} y ≤ 100% -0.2761 29 -0.6781 29 1.1416 4 0.5693 29 0.1170 29
y ≤ 50% -0.2754 28 -0.6779 28 1.1439 3 0.5702 28 0.1172 28
y ≤ 25% 0.0087 16 -0.4700 14 0.9402 8 1.0156 16 0.3046 3
y ≤ 20% 0.0293 6 -0.4515 6 0.8965 16 1.0553 6 0.3097 2
y ≤ 15% 0.0318 4 -0.4476 3 0.8680 27 1.0603 4 0.3038 4
y ≤ 10% 0.0236 9 -0.4572 8 0.8780 25 1.0439 9 0.2864 11
E6: EW (1/m) y = 6.25% 0.0829 1 -0.3614 1 0.6542 31 1.1620 1 0.3955 1
Ω (MAR=0,012)Rank RankRank Modified Sharpe 95% Rank Ω (MAR=0,008)Sortino MAR=0,008 Rank Sortino MAR=0,012Eh k
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Table 8 
Performance of CFOs 11, 15 and 18 
 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics, the results of the Jarque-Bera (JB), Lilliefors, and Genest-Remillard (G & R) tests for normality and the performance 
measures of CFO structures 11 (panel A), 15 (Panel B) and 18 (Panel C) constructed from the 31 hedge fund portfolios. For each of the three CFO structures, the 
nature of the underlying portfolio (set of preference and diversification constraint) appears on the vertical axis and their statistics within the particular CFO structure 
are presented horizontally. As a reference, the value of the debt portion of the CFO’s $400 M and the all-in funding cost, in basis points over the 1M LIBOR, 
appear at the top of each panel. The descriptive statistics are monthly and include the first four moments of the distributions, as well as the minimum and 
maximum returns. With regard to the tests for normality, the value of the test statistic and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the value is significant at a 
confidence level of 95% are presented*. The dummy variable equals 1 when the null hypothesis of normality is rejected. The performance measures (Sharpe, 
Treynor, Sortino, Modified Sharpe and Omega (Ω)) are also presented on a monthly basis. For the Sortino ratio and the Omega measure, the calculations are 
made for Minimal Accepted Return (MAR) levels of 0.8% and 1.2% monthly. The Modified Sharpe is computed based on a VaR with a 95% confidence level. 
Eh k Mean Variance Skewness
Excess 
kurtosis
JB 
α=5%
Lilliefors 
α=5%
G&R 
α=5% Sharpe Treynor
Sortino 
MAR=0.008
Sortino 
MAR=0.012
Modified 
Sharpe 
α=5%
Ω 
MAR=0.008
Ω 
MAR=0.012
E1: {α=1; β=0; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0098 1.255E-04 -0.2858 -0.0136 0 0 0 0.6472 0.0602 0.9963 0.769 0.7509 1.5024 0.6018
y ≤ 50% 0.0098 1.255E-04 -0.2858 -0.0136 0 0 0 0.6472 0.0602 0.9963 0.769 0.7509 1.5024 0.6018
y ≤ 25% 0.0098 1.460E-04 -0.4064 0.0752 0 0 0 0.6017 0.0473 0.8977 0.713 0.6216 1.4668 0.6245
y ≤ 20% 0.0098 1.667E-04 -0.4104 0.0762 0 0 0 0.5586 0.0391 0.8231 0.6628 0.5444 1.4090 0.6377
y ≤ 15% 0.0100 1.817E-04 -0.4135 -0.0191 0 0 1 0.5524 0.0388 0.8173 0.6635 0.5292 1.4435 0.6826
y ≤ 10% 0.0097 1.861E-04 -0.4443 -0.0123 0 1 1 0.5225 0.0377 0.7553 0.6162 0.4802 1.3567 0.6439
E2: {α=1; β=1; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0071 1.157E-04 0.4734 0.2580 0 0 0 0.4201 -0.5235 0.5943 0.4390 0.4786 0.8059 0.3329
y ≤ 50% 0.0071 1.158E-04 0.4729 0.2559 0 0 0 0.4202 -0.5181 0.5946 0.4393 0.4788 0.8064 0.3333
y ≤ 25% 0.0096 1.858E-04 0.0043 -0.2065 0 0 0 0.5179 0.0428 0.8107 0.6420 0.5497 1.3531 0.6461
y ≤ 20% 0.0100 1.817E-04 -0.1852 -0.2746 0 0 0 0.5482 0.0467 0.8407 0.6739 0.5654 1.4338 0.6780
y ≤ 15% 0.0095 1.808E-04 -0.1361 -0.4612 0 1 0 0.5194 0.1051 0.7842 0.6247 0.5270 1.3207 0.6303
y ≤ 10% 0.0099 1.794E-04 -0.2355 -0.5394 0 0 1 0.5460 0.0909 0.8255 0.6596 0.5498 1.3960 0.6706
E3: {α=1; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0097 1.790E-04 -0.1204 -0.2906 0 0 0 0.5359 0.0497 0.8216 0.6545 0.5585 1.3785 0.6504
y ≤ 50% 0.0097 1.790E-04 -0.1204 -0.2906 0 0 0 0.5359 0.0497 0.8216 0.6545 0.5585 1.3785 0.6504
y ≤ 25% 0.0096 1.803E-04 -0.0757 -0.3115 0 0 0 0.5236 0.0531 0.8019 0.6374 0.5459 1.3396 0.6350
y ≤ 20% 0.0097 1.803E-04 -0.1110 -0.3004 0 0 0 0.5329 0.0508 0.8170 0.6509 0.5547 1.3718 0.6497
y ≤ 15% 0.0098 1.864E-04 -0.1286 -0.3860 0 0 0 0.5326 0.0609 0.8170 0.6528 0.5483 1.3868 0.6698
y ≤ 10% 0.0099 1.835E-04 -0.2351 -0.4667 0 1 1 0.5448 0.0668 0.8258 0.6615 0.5476 1.4111 0.6826
E4: {α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0097 1.791E-04 -0.1920 -0.1883 0 0 0 0.5366 0.0422 0.8139 0.6516 0.5473 1.3829 0.6489
y ≤ 50% 0.0097 1.791E-04 -0.1920 -0.1883 0 0 0 0.5366 0.0422 0.8139 0.6516 0.5473 1.3829 0.6489
y ≤ 25% 0.0097 1.775E-04 -0.1939 -0.1886 0 0 0 0.5393 0.0429 0.8185 0.6546 0.5517 1.3858 0.6481
y ≤ 20% 0.0098 1.803E-04 -0.1847 -0.2076 0 0 0 0.5360 0.0431 0.8145 0.6519 0.5473 1.3840 0.6521
y ≤ 15% 0.0100 1.870E-04 -0.1854 -0.3037 0 0 0 0.5406 0.0491 0.8283 0.6635 0.5513 1.4187 0.6849
y ≤ 10% 0.0100 1.864E-04 -0.2818 -0.3614 0 1 1 0.5463 0.0531 0.8258 0.6639 0.5412 1.4294 0.6959
E5: {α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} y ≤ 100% 0.0074 1.159E-04 0.3280 -0.0388 0 0 0 0.4488 0.2628 0.6398 0.4747 0.5098 0.8689 0.3538
y ≤ 50% 0.0074 1.159E-04 0.3277 -0.0381 0 0 0 0.4496 0.2637 0.6412 0.4757 0.5111 0.8704 0.3543
y ≤ 25% 0.0097 1.890E-04 0.0167 -0.1873 0 0 0 0.5225 0.0403 0.8251 0.6536 0.5587 1.3806 0.6639
y ≤ 20% 0.0100 1.899E-04 -0.1505 -0.2202 0 0 0 0.5364 0.0404 0.8271 0.6637 0.5512 1.4256 0.6860
y ≤ 15% 0.0100 1.872E-04 -0.2307 -0.2506 0 0 0 0.5430 0.0456 0.8271 0.6650 0.5470 1.4285 0.6887
y ≤ 10% 0.0099 1.795E-04 -0.2604 -0.3925 0 1 1 0.5497 0.0705 0.8313 0.6654 0.5522 1.4137 0.6768
E6: EW (1/m) y = 6.25% 0.0106 2.565E-04 -0.3987 -0.1921 0 1 1 0.5033 0.0345 0.7522 0.6283 0.4491 1.4854 0.8058
CFO 11 (Debt = $200 M ; All-in funding cost = 150 bps over LIBOR 1 month)
PANEL A
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Table 8 
Performance of CFOs 11, 15 and 18 (continued) 
Eh k Mean Variance Skewness
Excess 
kurtosis
JB 
α=5%
Lilliefors 
α=5%
G&R 
α=5% Sharpe Treynor
Sortino 
MAR=0.008
Sortino 
MAR=0.012
Modified 
Sharpe 
α=5%
Ω 
MAR=0.008
Ω 
MAR=0.012
E1: {α=1; β=0; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0120 2.540E-04 -0.1768 -0.0826 0 0 0 0.5936 0.0568 0.9984 0.8212 0.6269 1.8739 1.0037
y ≤ 50% 0.0120 2.540E-04 -0.1768 -0.0826 0 0 0 0.5936 0.0568 0.9984 0.8212 0.6269 1.8739 1.0037
y ≤ 25% 0.0120 2.953E-04 -0.3433 0.0178 0 0 0 0.5520 0.0435 0.8855 0.7464 0.5221 1.7975 1.0072
y ≤ 20% 0.0120 3.400E-04 -0.3646 0.0435 0 0 0 0.5104 0.0354 0.8034 0.6847 0.4571 1.6978 0.9963
y ≤ 15% 0.0123 3.710E-04 -0.3883 -0.0460 0 1 1 0.5047 0.0351 0.7930 0.6801 0.4430 1.7162 1.0374
y ≤ 10% 0.0119 3.789E-04 -0.4098 -0.0714 0 1 1 0.4779 0.0342 0.7347 0.6319 0.4063 1.6207 0.9830
E2: {α=1; β=1; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0082 2.646E-04 0.6583 0.6494 1 0 0 0.3473 -0.2364 0.5518 0.4412 0.3476 1.0343 0.5617
y ≤ 50% 0.0082 2.647E-04 0.6577 0.6468 1 0 1 0.3475 -0.2350 0.5522 0.4416 0.3478 1.0349 0.5621
y ≤ 25% 0.0118 3.824E-04 0.0606 -0.3049 0 0 0 0.4703 0.0390 0.7901 0.6657 0.4552 1.6278 0.9696
y ≤ 20% 0.0122 3.666E-04 -0.1560 -0.4277 0 0 0 0.5035 0.0431 0.8248 0.6991 0.4732 1.7107 1.0270
y ≤ 15% 0.0117 3.664E-04 -0.0863 -0.5361 0 1 1 0.4762 0.1154 0.7742 0.6517 0.4446 1.5821 0.9598
y ≤ 10% 0.0121 3.595E-04 -0.1839 -0.6645 0 1 1 0.5042 0.0957 0.8214 0.6914 0.4686 1.6662 1.0157
E3: {α=1; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0119 3.594E-04 -0.0623 -0.4081 0 0 0 0.4935 0.0466 0.8147 0.6855 0.4733 1.6559 0.9894
y ≤ 50% 0.0119 3.594E-04 -0.0623 -0.4081 0 0 0 0.4935 0.0466 0.8147 0.6855 0.4733 1.6559 0.9894
y ≤ 25% 0.0117 3.626E-04 -0.0169 -0.4277 0 0 0 0.4814 0.0503 0.7952 0.6676 0.4617 1.6103 0.9655
y ≤ 20% 0.0119 3.620E-04 -0.0530 -0.4179 0 0 0 0.4907 0.0479 0.8103 0.6816 0.4702 1.6481 0.9868
y ≤ 15% 0.0121 3.736E-04 -0.0663 -0.4851 0 0 0 0.4914 0.0593 0.8123 0.6841 0.4679 1.6557 1.0078
y ≤ 10% 0.0122 3.663E-04 -0.1794 -0.5968 0 1 1 0.5041 0.0660 0.8225 0.6942 0.4691 1.6829 1.0269
E4: {α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0119 3.607E-04 -0.1434 -0.3167 0 0 0 0.4932 0.0387 0.8023 0.6786 0.4623 1.6623 0.9907
y ≤ 50% 0.0119 3.607E-04 -0.1434 -0.3167 0 0 0 0.4932 0.0387 0.8023 0.6786 0.4623 1.6623 0.9907
y ≤ 25% 0.0119 3.570E-04 -0.1445 -0.3204 0 0 0 0.4959 0.0394 0.8078 0.6825 0.4662 1.6675 0.9913
y ≤ 20% 0.0120 3.624E-04 -0.1323 -0.3354 0 0 0 0.4932 0.0396 0.8045 0.6799 0.4636 1.6622 0.9938
y ≤ 15% 0.0122 3.729E-04 -0.1244 -0.4274 0 0 0 0.5001 0.0462 0.8244 0.6962 0.4725 1.6962 1.0282
y ≤ 10% 0.0123 3.709E-04 -0.2267 -0.4916 0 1 1 0.5063 0.0506 0.8229 0.6968 0.4658 1.7089 1.0403
E5: {α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} y ≤ 100% 0.0087 2.595E-04 0.4900 0.2461 0 0 0 0.3784 0.3634 0.6023 0.4826 0.3799 1.1096 0.5994
y ≤ 50% 0.0087 2.594E-04 0.4902 0.2475 0 0 0 0.3792 0.3658 0.6039 0.4838 0.3810 1.1115 0.6002
y ≤ 25% 0.0119 3.888E-04 0.0769 -0.2680 0 0 0 0.4750 0.0365 0.8048 0.6781 0.4637 1.6552 0.9910
y ≤ 20% 0.0122 3.844E-04 -0.1036 -0.3333 0 0 0 0.4922 0.0369 0.8116 0.6889 0.4644 1.7013 1.0274
y ≤ 15% 0.0123 3.732E-04 -0.1756 -0.3896 0 0 0 0.5025 0.0425 0.8217 0.6959 0.4688 1.7050 1.0348
y ≤ 10% 0.0122 3.569E-04 -0.1913 -0.5283 0 1 1 0.5097 0.0705 0.8319 0.7010 0.4765 1.6917 1.0250
E6: EW (1/m) y = 6.25% 0.0131 5.175E-04 -0.3569 -0.1135 0 1 1 0.4648 0.0315 0.7350 0.6429 0.3909 1.7174 1.1298
CFO 15 (Debt = $280 M ; All-in funding cost = 200 bps over LIBOR 1 month)
PANEL B
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Table 8 
Performance of CFOs 11, 15 and 18 (continued) 
Eh k Mean Variance Skewness
Excess 
kurtosis
JB 
α=5%
Lilliefors 
α=5%
G&R 
α=5% Sharpe Treynor
Sortino 
MAR=0.008
Sortino 
MAR=0.012
Modified 
Sharpe 
α=5%
Ω 
MAR=0.008
Ω 
MAR=0.012
E1: {α=1; β=0; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0149 6.779E-04 -0.0187 0.0959 0 0 0 0.4749 0.0474 0.8314 0.7326 0.4418 1.9585 1.3345
y ≤ 50% 0.0149 6.779E-04 -0.0187 0.0959 0 0 0 0.4749 0.0474 0.8314 0.7326 0.4418 1.9585 1.3345
y ≤ 25% 0.015 7.978E-04 -0.2632 0.2770 0 0 0 0.4394 0.0348 0.7237 0.6497 0.3682 1.8608 1.3082
y ≤ 20% 0.0149 9.408E-04 -0.3193 0.3499 0 0 0 0.4018 0.0276 0.6445 0.5839 0.3196 1.7455 1.2680
y ≤ 15% 0.0154 1.038E-03 -0.3688 0.3002 0 0 0 0.3974 0.0275 0.6325 0.5759 0.3092 1.7514 1.2960
y ≤ 10% 0.0147 1.047E-03 -0.3740 0.1657 0 1 0 0.3764 0.0267 0.5891 0.5366 0.2870 1.6642 1.2325
E2: {α=1; β=1; γ=0} y ≤ 100% 0.0087 8.573E-04 0.8688 1.2782 1 1 1 0.2080 -0.0990 0.3433 0.3004 0.1762 1.0600 0.7474
y ≤ 50% 0.0087 8.573E-04 0.8682 1.2748 1 1 1 0.2082 -0.0986 0.3438 0.3008 0.1764 1.0607 0.7479
y ≤ 25% 0.0146 1.092E-03 0.1824 -0.0811 0 0 0 0.3632 0.0306 0.6259 0.5633 0.3135 1.6629 1.2187
y ≤ 20% 0.0152 1.004E-03 -0.0837 -0.3054 0 0 0 0.3996 0.0347 0.6682 0.6024 0.3343 1.7538 1.2895
y ≤ 15% 0.0145 9.800E-04 0.0330 -0.4012 0 0 0 0.3799 0.1286 0.6379 0.5707 0.3214 1.6425 1.2108
y ≤ 10% 0.0151 9.415E-04 -0.0809 -0.6626 0 1 1 0.4096 0.0978 0.6893 0.6157 0.3444 1.7311 1.2769
E3: {α=1; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0148 9.627E-04 0.0564 -0.3723 0 0 0 0.3943 0.0385 0.6726 0.6013 0.3400 1.7103 1.2484
y ≤ 50% 0.0148 9.627E-04 0.0564 -0.3723 0 0 0 0.3943 0.0385 0.6726 0.6013 0.3400 1.7103 1.2484
y ≤ 25% 0.0145 9.726E-04 0.1058 -0.4254 0 0 0 0.3832 0.0421 0.6553 0.5846 0.3304 1.6637 1.2176
y ≤ 20% 0.0148 9.691E-04 0.0682 -0.3887 0 0 0 0.3921 0.0397 0.6693 0.5981 0.3381 1.7027 1.2436
y ≤ 15% 0.0150 9.911E-04 0.0678 -0.4240 0 0 1 0.3960 0.0523 0.6781 0.6059 0.3421 1.7125 1.2634
y ≤ 10% 0.0153 9.583E-04 -0.0742 -0.6260 0 0 0 0.4101 0.0600 0.6915 0.6187 0.3456 1.7465 1.2889
E4: {α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} y ≤ 100% 0.0148 9.786E-04 -0.0544 -0.2381 0 0 0 0.3916 0.0307 0.6538 0.5876 0.3285 1.7100 1.2484
y ≤ 50% 0.0148 9.786E-04 -0.0544 -0.2381 0 0 0 0.3916 0.0307 0.6538 0.5876 0.3285 1.7100 1.2484
y ≤ 25% 0.0148 9.663E-04 -0.0537 -0.2516 0 0 0 0.3943 0.0313 0.6595 0.5922 0.3316 1.7162 1.2506
y ≤ 20% 0.0149 9.791E-04 -0.0351 -0.2727 0 0 0 0.3927 0.0316 0.6586 0.5912 0.3311 1.7112 1.2508
y ≤ 15% 0.0153 9.873E-04 -0.0033 -0.3939 0 1 0 0.4042 0.0385 0.6891 0.6171 0.3461 1.7537 1.2874
y ≤ 10% 0.0154 9.708E-04 -0.1297 -0.5004 0 0 0 0.4125 0.0432 0.6923 0.6210 0.3439 1.7710 1.3017
E5: {α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} y ≤ 100% 0.0094 8.231E-04 0.7112 0.8357 1 0 0 0.2395 0.7232 0.3967 0.3468 0.2053 1.1371 0.7980
y ≤ 50% 0.0095 8.222E-04 0.7120 0.8381 1 0 0 0.2403 0.7433 0.3984 0.3482 0.2061 1.1393 0.7993
y ≤ 25% 0.0148 1.111E-03 0.1996 -0.0070 0 0 0 0.3680 0.0284 0.6386 0.5749 0.3203 1.6894 1.2410
y ≤ 20% 0.0153 1.059E-03 -0.0150 -0.1675 0 0 0 0.3901 0.0292 0.6576 0.5935 0.3295 1.7425 1.2836
y ≤ 15% 0.0153 9.901E-04 -0.0701 -0.3556 0 0 0 0.4061 0.0349 0.6845 0.6145 0.3426 1.7594 1.2945
y ≤ 10% 0.0152 9.250E-04 -0.0578 -0.5521 0 0 1 0.4165 0.0654 0.7057 0.6298 0.3553 1.7602 1.2916
E6: EW (1/m) y = 6.25% 0.0167 1.412E-03 -0.3207 0.3804 0 0 0 0.3771 0.0255 0.6070 0.5588 0.2906 1.7599 1.3623
CFO 18 (Debt = $340 M ; All-in funding cost = 300 bps over LIBOR 1 month)
PANEL C
 
*  P-values are available upon request. 
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Table 9 
Results of Multivariate Linear Regressions for CFOs 1, 11, 15 and 18 
The table shows the results of the multivariate linear regression model applied to the returns of CFO structures 1, 11, 15 and 18. For every structure, the value of the coefficient 
respective to each independent variable and their corresponding p-value are presented. The coefficient δ is the model’s constant. Within each panel (A to D), the independent 
variables appear on the vertical axis and the underlying funds (set of preference and diversification constraint) are presented horizontally. The shaded values indicate a p-value 
below 5%.  
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.025818 0.021177 0.024543 0.025677 0.020373 0.026133 0.026712
STOCK 0.061247 -0.008493 0.082277 0.077032 0.006984 0.087423 0.129787
DEF -0.000675 -0.000480 -0.000671 -0.000603 -0.000451 -0.000659 -0.000639
LIQU -21.324371 -20.243579 -11.967612 -21.047440 -20.423683 -17.897796 -16.064178
TERM -2.305055 -2.320236 -2.013981 -2.712104 -2.214730 -2.580198 -2.646475
TREND -0.000144 -0.000127 -0.000122 -0.000143 -0.000116 -0.000142 -0.000151
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005
STOCK 0.0016 0.6536 0.0006 0.0018 0.7177 0.0003 0.0000
DEF 0.0097 0.0649 0.0353 0.0671 0.0889 0.0398 0.0677
LIQU 0.3550 0.3830 0.6723 0.4734 0.3886 0.5297 0.6060
TERM 0.0511 0.0512 0.1633 0.0713 0.0678 0.0770 0.0969
TREND 0.0014 0.0049 0.0249 0.0119 0.0112 0.0098 0.0123
PANEL A
CFO 1 (Direct exposure to Portfolio of HF)
coefficients
p-values
 
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.037932 0.031745 0.035875 0.037632 0.030135 0.038319 0.038088
STOCK 0.098863 -0.022917 0.134674 0.122659 0.004186 0.142237 0.217518
DEF -0.001056 -0.000803 -0.001073 -0.000942 -0.000749 -0.001033 -0.000944
LIQU -49.959631 -46.930344 -35.537299 -49.574431 -48.093856 -45.137863 -41.680773
TERM -3.254628 -3.444272 -2.654086 -3.858305 -3.212852 -3.641032 -3.606458
TREND -0.000253 -0.000230 -0.000217 -0.000250 -0.000211 -0.000249 -0.000257
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.0000 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0024 0.0006 0.0017
STOCK 0.0015 0.4848 0.0005 0.0019 0.8991 0.0002 0.0000
DEF 0.0119 0.0744 0.0353 0.0738 0.0986 0.0429 0.0884
LIQU 0.1794 0.2437 0.4326 0.2925 0.2362 0.3205 0.3996
TERM 0.0861 0.0935 0.2495 0.1082 0.1203 0.1162 0.1529
TREND 0.0005 0.0032 0.0131 0.0061 0.0073 0.0047 0.0073
PANEL B
p-values
coefficients
CFO 11
 
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.050856 0.044229 0.048016 0.050308 0.041476 0.051277 0.049340
STOCK 0.138615 -0.044203 0.191964 0.169802 -0.003430 0.201255 0.316547
DEF -0.001428 -0.001170 -0.001481 -0.001271 -0.001080 -0.001401 -0.001199
LIQU -81.254411 -76.995044 -62.397691 -80.775945 -79.772810 -75.565411 -69.526505
TERM -4.251777 -4.744886 -3.253458 -5.024286 -4.336980 -4.723197 -4.471656
TREND -0.000370 -0.000350 -0.000320 -0.000366 -0.000318 -0.000364 -0.000368
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.0001 0.0028 0.0022 0.0019 0.0048 0.0011 0.0037
STOCK 0.0017 0.3712 0.0004 0.0023 0.9445 0.0002 0.0000
DEF 0.0163 0.0841 0.0401 0.0868 0.1102 0.0507 0.1235
LIQU 0.1245 0.2043 0.3311 0.2243 0.1885 0.2378 0.3185
TERM 0.1135 0.1243 0.3183 0.1375 0.1594 0.1470 0.2073
TREND 0.0004 0.0029 0.0099 0.0045 0.0066 0.0034 0.0064
PANEL C
coefficients
CFO 15
p-values
 
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.074028 0.070676 0.069972 0.072836 0.064612 0.074630 0.066990
STOCK 0.218948 -0.099010 0.313963 0.262845 -0.027730 0.324006 0.534591
DEF -0.002167 -0.002082 -0.002329 -0.001924 -0.001884 -0.002143 -0.001600
LIQU -146.250322 -145.031986 -121.184595 -145.829989 -152.364230 -140.468397 -126.841879
TERM -6.021820 -7.488111 -4.120773 -7.066956 -6.627699 -6.635288 -5.641108
TREND -0.000590 -0.000613 -0.000512 -0.000579 -0.000546 -0.000579 -0.000563
{α=1; β=0; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 100%
{α=1; β=1; γ=0} 
y ≤ 20%
{α=2; β=1; γ=0.75} 
y ≤ 10%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 50%
{α=3; β=1; γ=0.25} 
y ≤ 15%
1/m
y = 6.25%
δ 0.0005 0.0075 0.0068 0.0056 0.0133 0.0034 0.0158
STOCK 0.0026 0.2660 0.0005 0.0037 0.7524 0.0003 0.0000
DEF 0.0264 0.0873 0.0514 0.1113 0.1178 0.0671 0.2110
LIQU 0.0934 0.1838 0.2559 0.1786 0.1592 0.1801 0.2700
TERM 0.1723 0.1766 0.4457 0.1990 0.2269 0.2119 0.3334
TREND 0.0005 0.0037 0.0127 0.0057 0.0088 0.0043 0.0112
PANEL D
p-values
coefficients
CFO 18
 
 
